‘Reasonably Foreseeable’ Victim Evidence

Reasonably Foreseeable Victim certainty1.DavinaDavina must prove that her depression is medically- treasure (McLoughlin v. OBrian (1983)) ca utilizationd by the accident and that she was a reasonably predictable victim. She must also show that her injury would be foreseeable in a person of reasonable fortitude (Page v. metalworker (1996)). Davina is a secondary victim (Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire constabulary (1992)) so must establish a close relationship surrounded by herself and Bertram, proximity to the accident and that her injury came through sight or comprehend of it. Bertram is Davinas brother Davina heard the accident and attended immediately later thus her subscribe should succeed,Whitchester District CouncilThe pothole whitethorn constitute a breach of the Councils traffic under section 41 of the Highways dissemble 1980 to maintain paths maintainable at public expense. However, section 58 provides a defence if the Council took reasonable care to s ecure that the part of the highway was not dangerous to traffic. Therefore, if the Council carries out regular inspection and makes well-timed repairs it will harbour fulfilled its duty.EthelredEthelred may be vicariously nonimmune for Conrads negligence, since Conrad is an employee (Ready composite Concrete (South East) Ltd v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance (1968)) playing in the course of employment although Conrad had finished his deliveries, he was going bear to the stock and thus not on a frolic of his give (Joel v. Morrison (1834)).ConradConrad owed Bertram the recognised duty between road users (Caparo v. Dickman (1990)) and must reach the timeworn of a reasonably competent number one wood (Nettleship v. Weston (1971)). Conrad was hurrying back to the depot suggesting he was speeding or driving carelessly particularly since he was unable to stop in time.In a case involving duplex causes of injury, Bertram only needs to show that a breach materially con tri just nowed to the injury (Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw (1956)). Running Bertram over with his lorry would cause a reasonably foreseeable (The Wagon Mound (No 1) (1961)) material contribution to his injuries which would not have occurred but for Conrads negligence (Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management (1969)).AlphonseAlphonse owed Bertram the recognised legal duty of care between road users (Caparo) and must show the same meter of care as a reasonably competent and experienced driver (Nettleship v. Weston). There is nothing to suggest that Alphonse was driving carelessly before smash the pothole. It is unlikely that he will be liable to Bertram.It is likely that his small wrist would be too remote for liability to a rhytidoplasty (Wagon Mound). Alphonse should have been aware of the difficulties walking whilst wearing a neck collar and taken extra care on stairs.BertramBy stepping into the road without looking, Bertram could be considered to be contrib utorily negligent. The initiation of a duty of care is irrelevant (Jones v. Livox (1952). If Bertram is found to be contributorily negligent any damages will be reduced to the utmost that his carelessness caused his injuries, considering the relative blameworthiness of the parties.(500 words)2. Private iniquityPrivate nuisance can be defined as unlawful interference with use or enjoyment of land. The claimant must be the landowner ( hunting watch v. Canary dockage Ltd (1997)) and the interference must be an unreasonable state of affairs causing damage or personal discomfort as a result. noble is the landowner. Frequent bonfires will constitute a state of affairs. In considering whether this is unreasonable, the fictional character of the neighbourhood will be considered (St Helens Smelting Co v. Tipping (1865)) in relation to the pointedness and type of interference that could be expected in that locality. It is likely that prevalent burning of tyres on village outskirts wou ld be unreasonable. authoritarian has been unable to enjoy his garden because of the smell smell is recognised as a recognised category of nuisance (Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd (1996)). Sumpoil would be liable as the creator of the nuisance. splinter will not be able to bring a claim for disruption to his mobile phone as he is not the landowner. cosmos nuisancePublic nuisance can be defined as nuisance which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a family of Her Majestys subjects (A-G v. PYA Quarries Ltd (1957)). Road users have been held to constitute a split (Castle v. St Augustines Links (1922)). Moreover, the claimant must have suffered special (particular) damage, which must be different in nature or extent from that suffered by the alleviation of the class. The smoke has adversely affected visibility for drivers and thus affects their convenience Lordly has suffered further damage and could therefore bring a claim in public nuisance against Sumpoil. cu rseSection 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 creates a statutory tort of harassment, satisfied if the defendant pursues a course of conduct (on at least two occasions (section 7(3)) that causes some other to experience harassment. Such conduct can include words (section 7(4)). Therefore, microprocessor chips frequent swearing at Sumpoil may give aerodynamic lift to liability for harassment if it caused Sumpoil to feel harassed, alarmed or distressed.Assault and bombingBattery is defined as the intentional direct application of long suit to another person. An assault is an act which causes the reasonable apprehension of infliction of a battery. Sumpoil walked up to Chip carrying a large wrench.. If Chip reasonably compass that Sumpoil was going to hit him, then Sumpoil would be liable for assault. Chip punching Sumpoil on the nose would constitute a battery, and, if Sumpoil apprehended the punch, would also give rise to an assault.Interference with businessLordly int erfered with the supply of goods to Sumpoils business and may be liable for the tort of interfering with business if he knew of the existence of the contract and intend to interfere with its performance (Merkur Island Shipping Corp v. Laughten(1983)) without suitable justification, leading to an actual breach of contract, causing damage. However, it is not clear whether the delays in delivery constituted a breach of contract or whether Sumpoil suffered resulting loss.(500 words) slant of casesA-G v. PYA Quarries Ltd 1957 1 All ER 894Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire guard 1992 1 AC 310Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 1969 1 QB 428Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw 1956 AC 613Caparo v. Dickman 1990 1 All ER 568Castle v. St Augustines Links (1922) 38 TLR 615Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd 1997 AC 655Joel v. Morrison (1834) 6 C P 501Jones v. Livox Quarries 1952 2 QB 608McLoughlin v. OBrian 1983 AC 410Merkur Island Shipping Corp v. Laughten1983 2 AC 570Nett leship v. Weston 1971 2 QB 691Page v. Smith 1996 1 AC 155Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance 1968 1 All ER 433St Helens Smelting Co v. Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642The Wagon Mound (No 1) 1961 1 All ER 404Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd 1996 Ch 19BibliographyHowarth, DR and OSullivan, JA (2003) Heppel Howarth Matthews Tort Cases Materials (5th edition), LexisNexis Butterworths, LondonMullis A and Oliphant K (2003) Torts (3rd edition), Palgrave Macmillan, BasingstokeRogers WVH (2002) Winfield Jolowicz on Tort (16th edition), Sweet and Maxwell, London